Do Financial Markets Expect a Significant Delay before EMU ? by A. Frachot
Do Financial Markets Expect a Signi￿cant Delay for EMU ?
Antoine Frachot⁄
First version: March 1997
This version: June 1997
Abstract. This short note shows that there exists a simple relation between
the private ECU, its theoretical value and the associated interest rates. From this
relation, one can estimate the time to EMU as expected by ￿nancial markets and
see whether this time is consistent with a monetary union taking place on January
1, 1999.
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1. Introduction
Private and O¢cial ECU have become two di⁄erent currencies for the past few years.
They are traded apart while no active mechanism enforces them to be traded at par. As
Folkerts-Landau and Graber (1995) note, ￿since November 1988, there has not existed
any private institutional arrangement or commitment to exchange the private ECU for
the Basket at par￿. As a consequence, their exchange rates against other currencies can
deviate substantially from par and market experience has shown that this deviation may
be quite large. Typically, the deviation between the two ECU widens during periods of
strong pessimism about the monetary union while it narrows when the run-up to EMU is
getting more credible.
The aim of this paper is to relate this deviation to the time to EMU as it is expected
by ￿nancial markets. Basically, we suppose that ￿nancial markets are uncertain about
the precise date when the monetary union will eventually take place. We assume however
that they are perfectly convinced that the private and o¢cial ECU will be set at par the
day EMU starts (whenever it does). There are strong reasons why we can assume that
￿nancial markets believe that this parity rule won￿t be violated. Indeed the Maastricht
Treaty states that the external value of the ECU shall not change at the moment the single
currency, the Euro, is introduced (Article 109l). Furthermore, at the Madrid summit (held
in December 1995), it was decided that the ECU would be converted into the Euro at a
rate of one for one at the beginning of the EMU. Combining these two statements with the
fact that the one for one rule refers to the o¢cial basket ECU implies that the institutional
arrangements will constrain the o¢cial and private ECU to be traded at par at the start
of EMU.
To summarize, we believe that ￿nancial markets are far more convinced about the
parity rule than the EMU starting on time (i.e., 1 January 1999). As a result, this
rule can straightforwardly act as an ￿anchor￿ for the link between private and o¢cial
ECU. Moreover, the current exchange rate between the two currencies should reveal some
information about the expected time before the EMU starts. More speci￿cally, we shall
show that a ￿covered interest rate parity￿-like relation holds between the two ECU and
the underlying interest rates. In addition, this relation is independent of the conversion
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rates of each currency which will be set (see Frachot (1997) for a full discussion concerning
conversion rates).
This paper is in line with previous attempts to compute a probability of EMU and
probabilities of each country￿s membership (see for example De Grauwe (1996) and JP
Morgan (1997)). However, we don￿t calculate such probabilities because they are di¢cult
to recover and necessitate some strong (untestable) assumptions1 leading to ambiguous
results. In particular, the resulting probabilities are never constrained to be positive nor
lower than 1. On the contrary, our approach doesn￿t need any speci￿c assumptions except
a No Free Lunch hypothesis which states that ￿nancial markets are e¢cient enough to
eliminate any free lunch.
2. A Covered Interest Rate Parity Relation
Our computations are extremely simple. We investigate how ￿nancial markets currently
capture the information that private and o¢cial ECU will be exchanged at par the day
EMU is launched. Let us denote this day by T and the exchange rate of currecny i
against dollar by S$ =i(i.e., 1 unit of i = S$ =idollars). Furthermore let us assume that
T =1 = 1 = 1999 has not full credibility but, whatever T is, ￿nancial markets are perfectly
convinced that:
S$ = private ECU(T)=S $= official ECU(T)
that is, the at-par rule will be respected. Note that this relation is not supposed to hold
for any other date (either before or after T). From the de￿nition of the o¢cial ECU,
markets thus assume that:
S$ = private ECU(T)=
X
i
! iS $=i( T) (1)
where i belongs to the set of currencies of the basket2 and !i is the amount of currency i
in the basket (see appendix 1).
At time t (t<T) , let us consider a trader who can invest either in the private ECU
or in the currencies of the basket. Let us denote ri(t;T) (respectively rECU(t;T))t h e
(zero-coupon) yield for currency i (resp. private ECU) and for maturity date T: Investing
S$=i(t)=[1 + ri(t;T)]
T¡tdollars at time t ensures that 1 unit of currency i is obtained
at time T: Consequently, if markets remove e¢ciently any free lunch then the following
relation should hold:










S$ = private ECU(t)










1This kind of computations considers that the current state of the economy is a combination of a ￿No
EMU￿ and a ￿EMU￿ states where each of theses states is weighted by its likelihood. For obvious reasons,
the estimation of what the pure ￿No EMU￿ and ￿EMU￿ states are, raises some important problems as
none of these states is observed in practice.
2Incidently we also assume that markets don￿t expect any change of the de￿nition of the basket.
Indeed, according to the Maastricht Treaty (Article 109g), the composition of the basket is frozen.Do Financial Markets Expect a Significant Delay for EMU ? 3
where pi(t) is the weight of currency i in the basket:
pi(t)=
! iS $=i( t )




According to the master formula (2), the di⁄erence between the private and the o¢cial
ECU can be seen as a weighted average of the spreads between the currency-i interest
rates and the ECU interest rate. As a by product, one may compute the time T which
solves equation (2). This duration reveals the horizon considered by ￿nancial markets
to build their hedging strategies regarding the run-up to EMU. As a consequence, this
duration may be interpreted as the time before EMU starts as re￿ected by
hedging strategies of the market participants.
3. Empirical Implementation
The previous duration can be easily computed provided that zero coupon yield curves are
available. We then use the zero coupon yield curves as given by Reuter. These curves are
derived from the swap market and smoothness is achieved through cubic spline interpo-
lation. They are continuously updated and are available for all countries of the basket
except for three countries: Ireland, Portugal and Greece. Fortunately, these three curren-
cies don￿t weigh heavily in the basket. However, we make the following approximation:
Portugese and Irish yield curves are approximated by the Spanish yield curve while the
Greek curve is approximated by the English yield curve. Of course, these approximations
may seem quite arbitrary. However, in the case of Ireland and Portugal, we relied on the
fact that their 10-year yields (in the bond market) are close to the Spanish 10-year yield.
For Greece, nothing can be said. So we arbitrarily took the English yield curve but the
in￿uence of the Greek curve is negligible in all our computations.
Furthermore, to assess the validity of these approximations, we derive a lower and an
upper bound for the expected time T. These bounds are computed by assuming that,
whatever they are, these three yield curves lay above the ECU curve and below the italian
curve. Economically, it simply means that Irish, Portugese and Greek yields are generally
below the italian yields but above the ECU yields. Obviously this assumption should be
reconsidered if important moves of these yield curves ever happened.
Graph 1 illustrates this framework. As we can see, markets generally expect a 2 years
and 3/6 months before the EMU starts, which is roughly speaking, consistent with a
monetary union starting on time. However, from March 14 until March 20, this duration
increased and returned back to normal after March 24. As a matter of fact, this period
coincides with the debate about whether the monetary union would be delayed due to
insu¢cient convergence of Maastricht Treaty criteria (especially the budget de￿cit ratio).
In particular, many german o¢cials claimed that, if criteria couldn￿t be satis￿ed, EMU
might be postponed.
On the other hand, things went back to normal on April 7, 1999 following the meeting
of Finance ministers on April 5/6. They decided the time-table for annoucement of
memberships and then showed their commitment to respect the scheduled time for EMU.
More generally, the appendix gives a brief account of Reuter headlines and one can see
that our indicator is in line with these headlines.
As a conclusion, our indicator may be a valuable tool to assess markets expectations
regarding EMU. Furthermore, if bad news were released in the forthcoming months (con-Do Financial Markets Expect a Significant Delay for EMU ? 4










































































































































































































































































































































Expected time to EMU
cerning for example the budget criterion) , it would be worth following this indicator in
order to see how markets react to these news.
APPENDIX: Reuter Headlines
During week March 17-March 21, some o¢cials have publicly considered the hypothesis
of a postponement of the EMU if Maastricht criteria weren￿t strictly satis￿ed. Following
is a sample of Reuter headlines related to this period:
† (March 14) Tietmeyer states that the EMU should be restricted to countries satis-
fying the criteria.
† (March 17) Meister (Bundesbank) states that the stability of the euro will depend
on a small core of homogeneous countries.Do Financial Markets Expect a Significant Delay for EMU ? 5
† (March 18) Kuehbacher (Bundesbank) considers that a postponement is the only
solution if Germany doesn￿t ful￿ll the criteria. He also adds that Germany should
take a rapid decision about postponement.
By the end of March 19, things get back to ￿normal￿:
† (March 19) Tietmeyer claims that EMU will start on January 1, 1999.
† (March 21) Waigel ensures that Germany will satisfy Maastricht criteria.
† (March 24) Kinkel claims that EMU must start on time.
On March 25, the Federal Reserve raises its Fed Funds rate and a future increase
of german rates become more likely. As it could endanger the whole path to EMU,
the expected time to EMU increases as well.
On April 5/6, Finance ministers meet at Noordwjik and detail the time-table for
announcement of memberships. As it could be interpreted as a strong commitment
to respect the scheduled time, the expected time to EMU becomes very close to
January 1, 1999.Do Financial Markets Expect a Significant Delay for EMU ? 6
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